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WRONG WAY GO BACK!  
REDISCOVERING THE PATH FOR CHARITY LAW REFORM 
 
 
MATTHEW TURNOUR AND MYLES MCGREGOR-LOWNDES

 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
A little over a decade ago, England and Wales led common law countries on 
a journey into statutory reform of the law of charities.1 A new legal framework 
was promised,2 but what was delivered fell well short of that. Before the 
legislative reform, common law jurisdictions had the common law’s three 
principal divisions of charitable purpose and a catch-all. After the reform process 
there are, in addition to the common law, variously between zero and 12 
statutory divisions and a catch-all.3 Dunn and Riley warned that the 
reclassification with additional statutory divisions ‘will inevitably lead to a 
burgeoning final category and, eventually, to the same criticisms that beset the 
current [pre-legislation] regime’.4 At best this form of legislative intervention 
could only postpone the need for a new legal framework.5 That need is now more 
pressing in England and Wales. In Australia, the government has announced that 
a statutory definition of charitable purpose is to be introduced for 
Commonwealth agencies with effect from 1 July 2013, and has issued a 
consultation paper.6 As part of the reform process, the Australian government has 
                                                
  Dr Matthew Turnour, Lecturer, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia; Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes, 
Director, The Australian Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies, Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane, Australia. 
1  Beginning with Philip Woodfield, Efficiency Scrutiny of the Supervision of Charities: Report to the Home 
Secretary and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1987). Barbados 
had moved to a statutory definition in 1979 but this did not trigger the widespread interest in statutory 
reform: Charities Act 1979 (Barbados) c 243.  
2  Secretary of State for the Home Department (UK), Charities: A Framework for the Future (Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989).  
3  Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth); Charities Act 1979 (Barbados) c 243; Charities Act 
2006 (UK) c 50; Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (NI) c 12; Charities and Trustee Investment 
(Scotland) Act 2005 (Scot) asp 10; Charities Act 2009 (Ireland). 
4  A Dunn and C A Riley, ‘Supporting the Not-For-Profit Sector: The Government’s Review of Charitable 
and Social Enterprise’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 632, 644.  
5  Ibid.  
6  Bill Shorten and Tanya Plibersek, ‘Making It Easier for Charities to Help Those Who Need It’ (Media 
Release, No 077, 10 May 2011); Commonwealth Treasury, A Definition of Charity: Consultation Paper 
(2011). 
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also agreed to consider a Senate Economics Committee recommendation that 
Australia follow the precedent of England and Wales to remove certain public 
benefit presumptions,7 despite the Charities Definition Inquiry recommending 
that the status quo be maintained.8  
In England and Wales, where the statutory reforms appeared to remove the 
presumption of public benefit, problems due to inadequate drafting have 
materialised amid allegations the Charity Commission’s function is being 
politicised.9 In parliamentary debates on the Charities Bill, both the government 
and the opposition gave commitments to review the public benefit provisions 
three years after implementation of the legislation. Following a change of 
government and without waiting for the review, the Attorney-General referred 
two cases, on his own motion, to the First-tier Tribunal (Charity) seeking 
clarification.10 The effect of both of those referrals has been less than satisfying 
for those seeking clarity. In the Independent Schools Council Case,11 the 
unanimous 109 page decision concluded by noting: ‘Our decision will not, we 
know, give the parties the clarity for which they were hoping.’12 The second case, 
known as the Benevolent Funds Case,13 substantially followed the principles set 
out in the Independent Schools Council Case, applying the principles to the relief 
of poverty head of charity law. It is not within the Tribunal’s remit to resolve 
either the underlying problem, or re-draft poorly drafted legislation. The review 
of the Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50 was conducted by Lord Hodgson, who 
reported on 16 July 2012 under the curious title Trusted and Independent: Giving 
Charity Back to Charities.14 Acknowledging that the law remained in a less than 
ideal state, he recommended, among other things, that ‘[i]n order to address 
future public concerns about “what constitutes a charity,” in practical as opposed 
                                                
7  Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010 (Cth). See also Senate Economics Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010 
(2010). 
8  Committee for Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, Parliament of 
Australia, Report of the Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations (2001) 
(‘Charities Definition Inquiry’), 14; Ch 13.  
9  Peter Luxton, Making Law? Parliament v The Charity Commission (Policy Series No 64, Politeia, 2009). 
10  Her Majesty’s Attorney-General, Questions for Reference by HM Attorney-General to Tribunal under 
Paragraph 2(1)(a) of Schedule 1D to the Charities Act 1993, 22 September 2010 
<http://www.charity.tribunals.gov.uk/documents/RegisterofCases/QuestRefbyHMAG.pdf>; Her 
Majesty’s Attorney-General, In the Matter of a Reference Pursuant to Schedule 1D of the Charities Act 
1993, 27 January 2011 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/tribunals/charity/NotesOfRef_27Jan11.pdf>. See also Stephen 
Cook, ‘Attorney General Refers Charity Commission’s Public Benefit Guidance to the Courts’, Third 
Sector (online), 9 September 2010 <http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/Article/1031979/Attorney-
General-refers-Charity-Commissions-public-benefit-guidance-courts>.  
11  Independent Schools Council v Charity Commission for England and Wales [2012] Ch 214 (‘Independent 
Schools Council Case’). 
12  Ibid 294 [260]. 
13  Charity Commission for England and Wales v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2012] UKUT B19 (TCC) 
(‘Benevolent Funds Case’). 
14  Cabinet Office (UK), Trusted and Independent: Giving Charity Back to Charities – Review of the 
Charities Act 2006 (Stationery Office, 2012). 
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to historical-legal terms, the Government should stimulate a widespread sector 
and public debate on the question’.15 
With a public debate to commence in Engand and Wales ‘to address future 
public concerns’, and Australia about to embark upon a similar journey (a 
legislated definition of charity is planned for commencement on 1 July 2013),16 
we return to the original project of developing a new legal framework, one that 
might be taken up by a court, but more likely by a parliament committed to 
significant structural reform. In summary, we argue that the path taken by 
England and Wales under the Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, now the Charities 
Act 2011 (UK) c 25, is misguided. It is not the best of the available options – we 
argue that a better path to reform can be discovered by going back to the 
common law precedents and rediscovering the underlying principles. We 
acknowledge that some of our concepts and observations are not orthodox; 
nevertheless they hold value in stimulating conceptual discourse about charity 
reform. 
We begin in Part II with a close re-reading and reappraisal of The 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel.17 Pemsel’s 
Case, with its categorisation of the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 
1601 43 Eliz 1, c 418 (‘Preamble’), is the foundation of the current common law 
understanding of charitable purpose.19 Its categorisation also underpins the 
structure of the legislative developments. Reforming the law beyond a catch-all 
residuary to a new legal framework, either by case law or statute, demands 
reappraisal of Pemsel’s Case.  
We suggest that the ratio decidendi of Pemsel’s Case, understood in the light 
of the obiter remarks, provides a path out of the problems that have led to ‘report 
after report directed to reforming various aspects of charity law’ over the last 20 
years.20 We argue that to resolve the problems, we must rediscover the 
underlying jurisprudence relied upon by all of the Law Lords including Lord 
Macnaghten. Returning to these underlying principles provides a basis for, and 
an example of, a different way of ordering the class of purposes that come within 
the doctrine of charitable purpose.21  
We argue that the meaning of ‘charitable purpose’ need not be rigidly 
partitioned into four heads, but rather takes its colour from context. We suggest 
that the Australian High Court understood the underlying jurisprudence correctly 
when it stated in Chesterman’s Case that the doctrine of charitable purpose ‘is 
                                                
15  Ibid 42.  
16  Commonwealth Treasury, Parliament of Australia, Budget Measures 2011–12 (2011) 37; Commonwealth 
Treasury, Definition of Charity, above n 6, 1–2. 
17  The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (‘Pemsel’s Case’). 
18  The Act is also commonly referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth. 
19  Hubert Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities (Bloomsbury Professional, 4th ed, 2010); 
National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31, 52–3 (Lord Porter).  
20  Gino Dal Pont, Law of Charity (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 527. 
21  This current, dominant articulation of the doctrine is from Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord 
Macnaghten). For the status of charitable purpose as a doctrine see also National Anti-Vivisection Society 
v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31, 52 (Lord Porter).  
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flexible to an immeasurable degree, as can be seen by reference to the judgments 
of such eminent masters of law and language as the Judges who sat in Pemsel’s 
Case’.22 When the Privy Council overruled the High Court in that case, it ossified 
the common law.23 The result is that three well-founded principles underpinning 
common law development are now ignored or misapplied, which has inhibited 
development of the law. We contend that this body of law can continue to 
develop by rediscovering the underlying jurisprudence and returning to usual 
common law methods. When applied in an enabling or regulatory context (to 
define the organisations enabled or regulated), charitable purpose performs a 
function different in scope from when it is applied as a basis for favour, such as 
in an income taxing statute (to decide which enabled or regulated organisations 
are entitled to particular favours). As a consequence, the doctrine of charitable 
purpose could apply in two related, but different, spheres.24  
We will then go on to consider altruism (Part III) and voluntarism (Part IV), 
on the basis that together they can replace reference to the ‘spirit and intendment’ 
of the Preamble. These closely related concepts are, we suggest, the 
contemporary articulation of the ‘piety of earlier times’ as that term was 
understood technically in Pemsel’s Case. Consistent with the High Court’s 
decision in the Chesterman’s Case, continual reference to the ‘extensive 
Elizabethan meaning’ and the process of reasoning by analogy must be 
abandoned for common law countries to have ‘a sensible meaning’ – or meanings 
– of charitable, and to ‘prevent tautology’.25  
In Part V, we will argue that the broad amorphous concept of public benefit 
rigidly applied from within the framework of the four heads of Pemsel’s Case is 
in need of theoretical development. This need is all the more pressing in a 
context where, following legislation in some common law countries, public 
benefit may no longer be presumed with respect to the first three heads. Other 
majority opinions in Pemsel’s Case, particularly the often neglected judgments of 
Lords Watson and Herschell, provide different approaches to public benefit. In 
summary we theorise that, independent of public benefit being a criterion for 
defining charities, favour is extended to charities based on contributions to public 
benefit. At its simplest, the greater the contribution to public benefit the greater 
the entitlement to favour. We contend that just as Lord Atkin postulated 
remoteness as part of developing the jurisprudential landscape we now recognise 
as negligence, public benefit could be theorised in a similar way to limit access to 
the class of organisations that pursue charitable purposes. Lord Atkin found that 
‘there must be and is some general conception of relations … of which the 
particular cases found in the books are but instances’26 and held that in effect 
there was a continuum between immediate and direct consequences and 
                                                
22  Chesterman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1923) 32 CLR 362, 384 (Isaacs J) (‘Chesterman’s 
Case’). 
23  Chesterman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AC 128 (‘Chesterman’s Case Appeal’). 
24  Peter Luxton, The Law of Charities (Oxford University Press, 2001) 30. 
25  Chesterman’s Case (1923) 32 CLR 362, 384 (Isaacs J). 
26  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580.   
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consequences that were too remote to sum in damages at law. In a similar way 
we suggest that there is a continuum of public benefit where, in some cases, the 
benefit to the public is clear and direct and there can be no doubt of charity 
status, and perhaps also of entitlement to exemption and deductibility. As the 
evidence of public benefit becomes more remote so too might entitlement to 
deductibility or exemption. If public benefit is analysed as on a continuum (as the 
Duke of Edinburgh suggested in 199427) then division into heads with a catch-all 
is unnecessary, as the critical point becomes where on the continuum between 
public and private benefit there is sufficient public benefit to justify first 
entitlement to charity status and second entitlement to favours. We will argue 
that these are best addressed as separate questions. A more sophisticated 
alternative division of public benefit for the purpose of both recognising entities 
as charities and also accessing favours is also offered, by developing from the 
four heads of Pemsel’s Case three broader, collectively exhaustive classes which 
are each in turn discussed in Parts VI to VIII. They are: 
a. Dealing with Disadvantage which is for advancement of equality; 
b. Encouraging Edification which is for advancement of fraternity; and 
c. Facilitating Freedom which is for advancement of liberty. 
The implications of this theory for the law reform discourse in both the 
United Kingdom and Australia are outlined in Part IX. First, the foundations for 
reform must begin with a recognition that 20th century cases have taken the 
doctrine of charitable purpose the wrong way. Second, if rigid categorisation and 
even adding categories of charitable purpose are inadequate measures, it suggests 
that the law must develop by a return to underlying principles. This offers a fresh 
approach to identifying and developing those principles in a reforming context. 
We do not deal explicity with the associated tax reform questions, but the theory 
is developed with an eye to its possible application in classifying entities 
excluded from favours, entitled to tax exemption and entitled to deductibility. In 
summary then, this paper starts with Pemsel’s Case and proceeds inductively 
towards an alternative, but unified, common law charity jurisprudence.  
 
II   PEMSEL’S CASE 
Pemsel’s Case was a decision of the House of Lords on appeal from 
Scotland, decided by majority in 1891. The question for the Court was whether 
or not certain religious purposes were charitable, and thus entitled to income tax 
exemption. Pemsel was the treasurer of the Church of the United Brethren, 
commonly called Moravians.28 Commissioners for Special Purposes were tax 
collectors.29 Bates was a benefactor who had given land on trust to trustees for 
                                                
27  Prince Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh, ‘Charity or Public Benefit’ (Speech delivered at the 11th Arnold 
Goodman Charity Lecture, Charities Aid Foundation, 9 June 1994). 
28  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 554 (Lord Watson). 
29  Ibid 554–5 (Lord Watson). 
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the Moravians. The trustees had enjoyed income tax exemption on the rents and 
other income from that land for over seventy years when the Commissioners 
decided not to allow income tax exemption on part of the income.30 The central 
question for the Court was whether the purposes set out in the trust (which was 
settled in England but situated in Scotland) were ‘charitable purposes’ under 
section 61 of the Income Tax Act 1842 (Imp) 5 & 6 Vict, c 35, and thus exempt.31 
The contested wording of the trust provided:  
(1)  As to two equal fourth parts thereof, for the general purposes of maintaining, 
supporting, and advancing the missionary establishments among heathen 
nations of the Protestant Episcopal Church, known by the name of Unitas 
Fratrum, or United Brethren.32 
The argument for the Commissioners was essentially that in Scotland, where 
the appeal originated, the expression ‘charitable purpose’ excluded advancement 
of religion and was confined to aspects of poverty relief.33 The way the taxing 
legislation was drafted did not invite the argument that relief of poverty should 
be treated differently as a subcategory of charitable purpose.34 The argument 
advanced was simply that poverty relief covered the whole class of charitable 
purpose. It was conceded by counsel for both parties, and accepted by all of the 
Law Lords, that the popular meaning of the term ‘charitable purpose’ was 
problematic.35 The extent to which the popular and legal meanings of ‘charitable 
purpose’ were coterminous was strenuously argued.36 There was a line of case 
law reaching back prior to the Statute of Charitable Uses by which the Courts of 
Chancery, and later the common law courts, had exercised jurisdiction over trusts 
for charitable purposes. Those trusts had been for purposes other than the relief 
of poverty.37 Importantly, they extended to include trusts for the advancement of 
religion.38 For the Commissioners to succeed, a majority would have to hold that 
a narrow, Scottish meaning applied in this case, limiting the definition of 
charitable purpose to the relief of poverty and excluding the religious purpose set 
out in the trust settled by Bates. 
                                                
30  Ibid 574 (Lord Macnaghten). The year of settlement was 1813. See also Michael J Gousmett, The 
Charitable Purposes Exemption from Income Tax: Pitt to Pemsel 1798–1891 (PhD Thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 2009); Myles McGregor-Lowndes, ‘Public/Private Accountability and the Tax Exempt 
Status of Charitable Organisations’ (Seminar Paper, Social Policy Research Centre, University of New 
South Wales, 20 February 2003); William Ewart Gladstone, The Financial Statements of 1853 (William 
Clowes and Sons, 1863) 458.  
31  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 539, 541 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury), 554 (Lord Watson), 563–4 (Lord 
Bramwell), 568–70 (Lord Herschell), 575–6 (Lord Macnaghten).  
32  Ibid 541 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury).  
33  Ibid 550–1. 
34  Thomas Kelley, ‘Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit 
Law’ (2005) 73 Fordham Law Review 2437. Public benevolent institutions in Australia are now provided 
for in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 30.45 item 4.1.1.  
35  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 542–5 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury), 556–8, 561 (Lord Watson), 566 (Lord 
Bramwell), 569–73 (Lord Herschell), 580–4 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris).  
36  Ibid 532–9.  
37  Ibid 534, 543 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury), 557–9 (Lord Watson), 573 (Lord Herschell), 583 (Lord 
Macnaghten).  
38  Ibid 534.  
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A   The Ratio Decidendi of the Decision and the Orthodox  
Reading of the Case 
By a majority of four to two, the House of Lords held that the use of the 
words ‘charitable purpose’ in the Income Tax Act 184239 extended exemption to 
the income in question. The majority view was that income applied ‘for the 
general purposes of maintaining, supporting, and advancing the missionary 
establishments among heathen nations of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 
known by the name of Unitas Fratrum, or United Brethren’ was applied for a 
charitable purpose.40 
The following words from the judgment of Lord Macnaghten have become 
famous for articulating the principle of law emerging from the case, which is that 
the meaning of the expression ‘charitable purpose’ is not confined in a taxing 
statute to relief of poverty, but extends to include advancement of religion, as it 
did in defining the jurisdiction of the Courts of Chancery. Lord Macnaghten 
stated:  
How far then, it may be asked, does the popular meaning of the word ‘charity’ 
correspond with its legal meaning? ‘Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four 
principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of 
education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes 
beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The 
trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because 
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that 
deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly. It seems to me that a 
person of education, at any rate, if he were speaking as the Act is speaking with 
reference to endowed charities, would include in the category educational and 
religious charities, as well as charities for the relief of the poor. Roughly speaking, 
I think he would exclude the fourth division. Even there it is difficult to draw the 
line. A layman would probably be amused if he were told that a gift to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer for the benefit of the nation was a charity. Many 
people, I think, would consider a gift for the support of a lifeboat a charitable gift, 
though its object is not the advancement of religion, or the advancement of 
education, or the relief of the poor. And even a layman might take the same 
favourable view of a gratuitous supply of pure water for the benefit of a crowded 
neighbourhood. But after all, this is rather an academical discussion. If a 
gentleman of education, without legal training, were asked what is the meaning of 
‘a trust for charitable purposes,’ we think he would most probably reply, ‘That 
sounds like a legal phrase. You had better ask a lawyer.’41  
By 1947, and even though Lord Macnaghten’s opinion is quite open textured, 
this classification in a ‘legal sense’ into ‘four principal divisions’ had become so 
dominant that all legal analysis of the definition of charitable purpose was 
                                                
39  (Imp) 5 & 6 Vict, c 35, s 61.  
40  As to the minority view, Lord Chancellor Halsbury in his dissent stated: ‘That there are some objects 
which would be charitable objects under these trusts, I do not deny; but the question here argued is 
whether the funds are all applicable and applied to charitable purposes. For these reasons I am of opinion 
that the judgment appealed from ought to be reversed’: Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 554 (emphasis in 
original). Lord Bramwell, who wrote his own dissenting opinion, concurred with the Lord Chancellor: at 
563. 
41  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583–4.  
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undertaken with reference to the classification.42 The focus on these four 
categories has increased rather than decreased since 1947, with all of the major 
texts analysing charitable purpose in terms of the four heads.43 Most recently, the 
High Court of Australia has had three opportunities to develop the law and has 
elected not to disturb this approach in general. In Central Bayside General 
Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue, Kirby J made the 
point that ‘it is by no means self-evident that Pemsel provides the starting point 
for defining the word “charitable”’.44 The majority considered that the Court 
could not reform the law to a modern paradigm without the benefit of 
argument.45 The Supreme Court of Canada reached a similar decision in AYSA 
Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency), holding that the 
taxation consequences of developing an alternative approach obliged the Court to 
leave the matter to Parliament.46 In the United Kingdom, the Upper Tribunal has 
taken a similar approach in the Independent Schools Case.47 It follows that 
charitable purpose, as presently understood in common law countries, is read 
through a particular lens that lets through only images shaped according to the 
‘four principal divisions’ of Pemsel’s Case.48 It is not beyond the courts to 
develop this body of law and the recent Australian High Court decision in the 
Aid/Watch Case49 is an example, but the preponderance of judicial comment 
seems to weigh in favour of statutory amendment having regard to fiscal 
consequences.  
We do not quibble with taking this passage from Lord Macnaghten’s opinion 
as a declaration of the ratio decidendi of Pemsel’s Case. We might not even 
quibble with a case that looks to the four principal divisions as proof that a 
purpose is charitable. Our quibble is with replacing the method of reasoning that 
led to the decision in Pemsel’s Case with a reference only to the four heads. The 
current orthodox reading focuses only on the four heads and excludes the 
jurisprudential context in which Lord Macnaghten’s judgment was placed. Put 
                                                
42  National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31, 52–3 (Lord Porter).  
43  Picarda, above n 19; Luxton, above n 24; Jean Warburton, Debra Morris and N F Riddle, Tudor on 
Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed, 2003); John Mowbray et al, Lewin on Trusts (Sweet and Maxwell, 
18th ed, 2008); Dal Pont, above n 20. 
44  Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 
168, 205 [109].  
45  Ibid 178–9 fn 28; cf 195–7 (Kirby J). The High Court was not invited to change the categories in 
Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Limited (2008) 236 CLR 204, and it did not. However, in 
the recent decision of Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539 
(‘Aid/Watch Case’), it has opened the classes considerably, and political purposes are no longer presumed 
to be excluded.  
46  The Canadian Supreme Court has eschewed responsibility for this development, declaring that ‘wholesale 
reform [as distinct from] incremental change … is best left to Parliament. … [and] substantial change in 
the definition of charity must come from the legislature rather than the courts’: AYSA Amateur Youth 
Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency) [2007] 3 SCR 217, 242 [44] (Rothstein J delivering the 
judgment of McLachlin CJ, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and Rothstein JJ).  
47  [2012] Ch 214, 294 [260]. 
48  India and South Africa are notable exceptions. See Direct Taxes Code Bill 2009 (India) and Income Tax 
Act 1962 (South Africa) ss 10(1)(cN), 30(1), 37B. 
49  Aid/Watch Case (2010) 241 CLR 539. 
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simply, we say that the methodology applied across all the opinions in Pemsel’s 
Case – which sought to identify whether ‘maintaining, supporting and advancing 
the missionary establishments among heathen nations’50 was a charitable purpose 
– has been replaced by a process requiring all claims to charitable purpose to 
assert that they come within the four principal divisions referred to by Lord 
Macnaghten. We hasten to add that categorisation is of great utility. We will 
argue below for a different classification of forms of public benefit. 
Classification follows definition of the genus, though, and cannot replace it.  
From all six opinions it is clear that each Law Lord clearly explored the 
essence of charitable purpose and differentiated charitable from non-charitable 
purpose. The court was divided, but that does not mean that they were divided on 
the appropriate method – only on the outcome of applying that common law 
method to the facts. The majority comprised Lords Watson, Herschell, 
Macnaghten and Morris. In dissent were the Lord Chancellor and Lord 
Bramwell. None of these Law Lords proceeded by analogy with purposes listed 
in the Preamble; it was merely observed to be a list of purposes considered 
charitable.51 Nor did any Law Lord rely upon the ‘four principal divisions’. They 
all applied usual principles of legal reasoning.52 The opinions focus on two things 
in exploring the concept of charitable purpose at law: 
a. the centrality of public benefit;53 and 
b. the antecedent jurisprudence anchored in the concept of the pious use.54 
None of the Law Lords considered that the Preamble did anything other than 
set out the context of the Statute of Charitable Uses. None considered that it 
contained the definition of anything – in particular, of charitable purpose. At 
most, the Preamble was affirmed as an index or chart.55 
Only Lord Bramwell (who was in the minority) attempted a comprehensive 
definition of charitable purpose.56 The majority were content to decide that 
religion was within the scope of the popular and the legal definitions. The 
                                                
50  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 541 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury). 
51  Ibid 581 (Lord Macnaghten). 
52  Ibid 551–2 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury, dissenting), 561 (Lord Watson), 564 (Lord Bramwell, also 
dissenting), 573 (Lord Herschell), 583–4 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris). 
53  All agreed on the centrality to the concept of charitable purpose of benefiting others, particularly poor 
persons. The controversy was whether public benefit extended to evangelisation of the heathen. See 
Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 541, 552 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury, dissenting), 556–7 (Lord Watson); 
564–6 (Lord Bramwell, also dissenting); 571–3 (Lord Herschell, but note rejection of limitation for 
public good: at 572), 583–4 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris).  
54  Ibid 549 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury, agreeing with Lord Watson on application and interchange of pious 
and godly in charitable purpose but not as to the extent of its application), 558–9 (Lord Watson), 564 
(Lord Bramwell, also dissenting but arguably, in agreeing with Lord Chancellor Halsbury, accepting Lord 
Watson’s analysis on this point, but not the extent of its application. Note though that Lord Bramwell 
defined charitable purpose without any reference to motive), 572 (Lord Herschell, ‘compassion or 
sympathy’), 580–81 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris).  
55  Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 4. See where their Lordships referred to it in those terms: 
Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 542–4 (Lord Chancellor Halsbury, dissenting), 559 (Lord Watson), 566 
(Lord Bramwell, also dissenting), 581 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris). 
56  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 563–8 (Lord Bramwell). 
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majority pointed to characteristics of charitable purpose and reasons why 
advancement of religion was within those particular characteristics. The ‘four 
principal divisions’ were not treated as a classification, but an illustration of the 
central issue in the case, which was that the advancement of religion is clearly 
within the scope of the operation of the doctrine of charitable purpose.57 This is 
illustrated by Lord Macnaghten himself, who described the segmentation into 
four principal divisions as ‘rather an academical discussion’.58 
So, whilst the ‘four principal divisions’ are clearly integral to the ratio 
decidendi of the case, they: 
a. do not vitiate or replace the underlying jurisprudence that defines the 
jurisdiction of courts; and 
b. do not operate as a definition of either:  
i. the essence; or  
ii. the differentiating features of charitable purpose; but rather,  
c. declare that certain characteristics, namely relief of poverty, 
advancement of education and advancement of religion, are within the 
legal definition of charitable purposes.  
 
B   Two Charitable Purposes: Defining Jurisdiction and Justifying Favour 
‘There is no necessary link between charitable status and tax relief’, declared 
Luxton,59 and he is right. This is not a new idea. The need to distinguish the two 
different functions performed by what the law labels ‘charitable purpose’ was 
highlighted by Lord Chancellor Halsbury. The Lord Chancellor did not have 
difficulty with a broad interpretation of the doctrine of charitable purpose for 
defining the jurisdiction of the court for regulatory purposes as the Court of 
Chancery had done, but considered a different definition should apply to the 
granting of favour.60 Now it might be said at this point that the Lord Chancellor 
was in the minority. All of the other Law Lords concurred on the point that 
context informs charitable purpose.61 
If all six Law Lords in Pemsel’s Case allow for a flexible reading of the 
meaning of charitable purpose at common law, we contend that Pemsel’s Case 
itself is authority for freedom to develop the doctrine of charitable purpose 
beyond the present strictures of the ‘four principal divisions’. If it is accepted that 
the four principal divisions are not fixed categories determining the technical, 
legal definition of charitable purpose, but rather that charitable purpose ‘is used 
at different times in varying senses, broader or narrower’,62 then there is a basis 
                                                
57  Ibid 557 (Lord Watson), 572 (Lord Herschell), 583 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord Morris). 
58  Ibid 584 (Lord Macnaghten). 
59  Luxton, above n 24, 30. 
60  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 542 (Lord Halsbury). 
61  Ibid 573 (Lord Herschell), 565 (Lord Bramwell), 573 (Lord Watson), 586 (Lord Macnaghten), 592 (Lord 
Morris). 
62  Ibid 573 (Lord Herschell). 
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for at least two readings of charitable purpose: one broad and one narrow. These 
different readings logically follow the two quite different functions being 
fulfilled at law by the doctrine of charitable purpose. A broad reading logically 
applies to the defining of a jurisidiction which regulates charities. For example, 
all charities that fall within this definition will be under the jurisdiction of charity 
commissioners, though these charities need not all be entitled to the same 
favours. They might or might not be, depending upon how legislation granting 
favours describes the organisations entitled to them. For example, only some 
charities in Australia enjoy deductible gift recipient status – those that are also 
public benevolent institutions; the remainder only enjoy tax exemption.63 
A narrow reading may be appropriate in the situation where the doctrine 
determines entitlement to favour. For example, not all regulated charities enjoy 
the same favours. Some may enjoy only exemption from taxation and others, 
such as those providing relief of poverty, might enjoy exemption and 
deductibility. We contend that this division is a threshold, one that Lord Cross 
was willing to acknowedge in Dingle v Turner, in observing that the definition of 
charitable purpose was influenced in the late 20th century by revenue 
considerations.64 Even if it is not a division that presently informs the doctrine of 
charitable purpose, it is a division which can be derived from within the 
methodology applied in Pemsel’s Case, but not by focusing exclusively on Lord 
Macnaghten’s classification. Following this approach, a gift for a purpose which 
is not charitable, for example a superstitious or indifferent purpose, could be 
recognised as a purpose gift, but entitlement to the favours available to charitable 
purpose trusts could be declined on the basis that the evidence of public benefit is 
too remote to justify access to favourable tax treatment.65 
We have argued that regulating can be separated from favouring as a logical 
development of the common law traceable to the opinions in Pemsel’s Case. We 
will shortly set out a basis for replacing reference to the spirit and intendment of 
the Preamble with reference to altruism and voluntarism. First, we explain why 
this is necessary.  
Why has there been ‘report after report directed to reforming various aspects 
of charity law’ over the last 20 years?66 The puzzle to be resolved is how the 
common law painted itself into a corner requiring statutory reform. As a matter 
of first principles, common law legal method should be able to develop without 
the need for statutory assistance. Why then have these problems arisen in the 
context of the doctrine of charitable purpose? The answer is that three basic, 
well-known principles, usually applied in casuist method in the development of 
the common law, have been ignored or misapplied. Had this not happened, there 
                                                
63  Compare Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 30.45 item 4.1.1 with s 30.45 item 50.5.  
64  Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601, 625, but note that the majority expressly rejected this. See also 
Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 3. It has been explicitly acknowledged as relevant in Canada: 
AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency) [2007] 3 SCR 217.  
65  Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 Ves Jr 522. See also Adam J Hirsch, ‘Bequests for Purposes: A 
Unified Theory’ (1999) 56 Washington and Lee Law Review 33, 62.  
66  Dal Pont, above n 20, 527. 
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might have been no need for ‘report after report’. The three legal principles, 
which we will discuss in the context of the doctrine of charitable purpose, are: 
Principle 1: The preamble to an Act of Parliament sets out (only) background 
and context.67  
Principle 2: In the reading of a case, there is a presumption that there is 
jurisprudence giving effect to a public policy in the ratio decidendi of the 
case.68  
Principle 3: A definition defines something.69  
 
1 Principle 1: The preamble to an Act of Parliament sets out (only) 
background and context  
The preamble to an Act is not intended to define anything. This means it is 
not essential to the validity of the Act.70 Unless the operative part of the Act 
declares otherwise, the preamble does not contain the definition (of anything).71 
In Pemsel’s Case, Lord Macnaghten stated that the object of the Statute of 
Charitable Uses ‘was merely to provide new machinery for the reformation of 
abuses in regard to charities’.72 In this section, we return to that purpose and 
plunge back into the history of the Preamble.73   
Not all Acts declare the law. Some Acts simply enable administrative tasks to 
be performed.74 The Preamble was part of an Act creating machinery for 
commissioners to investigate abuses of charitable trusts.75 The fact that, contrary 
to tenets of statutory interpretation, it has come to be read almost as a 
                                                
67  D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Butterworths, 5th ed, 2001) 15. 
68  Julius Stone, ‘The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi’ (1959) 22 Modern Law Review 597; Kenneth J 
Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Westview Press, 1996) 3,  
 20–1.  
69  Leslie William Melville, The Draftsman's Handbook (Oyez Longman, 1979) 10, referring to the second 
of Sir Henry Thring’s two points about the drafting of definitions.  
70  Pearce and Geddes, above n 67, 15.  
71  Prince Ernest of Hanover v Attorney-General [1957] AC 436, 463 (Viscount Simonds); Wacando v 
Commonwealth (1981) 141 CLR 1, 23 (Mason J); AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada 
(Revenue Agency) [2007] 3 SCR 217, 229 [16]. This recognition of the contextual role played by The 
Preamble can be compared to the more conservative approach, from which the ‘no recourse rule’ stems, 
whereby a preamble should only be consulted if an ambiguity arises. See Anne Winckel, ‘The Contextual 
Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 184, 185–6; 
Pearce and Geddes, above n 67, 191–2.  
72 Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 581 (Lord Macnaghten). 
73  For discussion of purpose and context generally see Gareth Jones, History of the Law of Charity 1532–
1827 (WW Gaunt & Sons, 1969) 27, 107; Picarda, above n 19, 8–11; James Fishman, ‘The Political Use 
of Private Benevolence: The Statute of Charitable Uses’ (Pace Law Faculty Publications, Paper No 487, 
Pace University School of Law, 2008) 28–42 <http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/487/>;  Kerry 
O’Halloran, Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Karla Simon, Charity Law and Social Policy: National and 
International Perspectives on the Functions of the Law Relating to Charities (Springer, 2008) 28–30.  
74  See Charities Act 2005 (NZ) s 8.  
75  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 581 (Lord Macnaghten). See also Jones, above n 73, 27, 107; and Picarda, 
above n 19, 8–11. 
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codification of substantive law is part of the problem with defining charitable 
purpose by reference to the Preamble.  
The process by which the Preamble becomes a definition is as follows. In 
1605, a Mr Romilly (later Sir Samuel Romilly), for the purposes of arguing a 
case that depended upon a narrow definition of charitable purpose,76 categorised 
the list in the Preamble into four broad groupings.77 These suggested categories 
were not taken up in the judgment but were subsequently adopted in a leading 
text on the law of charities.78 Lord Macnaghten substantially adopted these four 
categories in his reasons for judgment in Pemsel’s Case.79 From that 
categorisation, the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of charitable purpose 
has developed: for a purpose to be charitable, it must fall within one of the four 
heads of charitable purpose listed by Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel’s Case and be 
for public benefit.80  
The use of the categories in the contexts of both Morice v Bishop of 
Durham81 and Pemsel’s Case is eminently reasonable, but the categories alone 
were not the reasons for judgment in either case. In Morice v Bishop of Durham, 
they were not adopted into the reasons for judgment. In Pemsel’s Case, Lord 
Macnaghten seems to have described his musing over the classification into ‘four 
principal divisions’ as ‘academical’.82 Even if the term ‘academical’ was a 
reference to the distinction between lay and legal understandings of a trust for 
charitable purposes, the fundamental point that the categories were not the reason 
for judgment remains. With the classification having now taken on the 
significance that it has, the divisions have become law: they are beyond 
‘academical’. The list itself, which, according to Fishman, recited the ‘proper 
objects of charitable interest’ solely unintentionally,83 has become the rationale. 
This is the first underlying methodological problem. 
 
2 Principle 2: The presumption of jurisprudence giving effect to public policy 
in the ratio decidendi of a case – the overlooked but underlying 
jurisprudence of Pemsel’s Case 
Typically in the reading of a case, there is a presumption that there is a 
jurisprudence giving effect to a public policy in the ratio decidendi of the case.84 
Sound jurisprudential reasoning may dissent from that reasoning and it may be 
                                                
76  Morice v Bishop of Durham [1805] 10 Ves Jr 522. 
77  Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 12. 
78  Leonard Syer Bristowe and Walter Ivimey Cook, The Law of Charities and Mortmain: Tudor’s 
Charitable Trusts (Reeves and Turner, 3rd ed, 1889) 2. 
79  Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 13. 
80  Luxton, above n 24, 112; Dal Pont, above n 20, 161–2, 181–3, 191–211, 212–45, 246–79; Denis Ong, 
Trusts Law in Australia (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 330; Philip H Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts 
(Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2006) 251; Picarda, above n 19, 12–13; O’Halloran, McGregor-
Lowndes and Simon, above n 73, 29–31.  
81  Morice v Bishop of Durham [1805] 10 Ves Jr 522. 
82  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 584 (Lord Macnaghten). 
83  Fishman, above n 73, 33.  
84  Stone, above n 68; Vandevelde, above n 68, 3, 20–1.  
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overruled, but it does not overlook it. Had the underlying jurisprudence not been 
overlooked, the current problems with the doctrine of charitable purpose might 
not have arisen.  
If Lord Macnaghten considers that his classification is ‘academical’ and that 
the jurisprudence of charitable purpose rests on foundations independent of the 
Statute of Charitable Uses, how can his opinion have been read as one of 
classification and without reference to the underlying jurisprudence? The answer 
lies in the problem of defining charitable purpose. Lord Macnaghten was 
concerned that if the popular notion of charity was adopted, it would lead to the 
‘hopeless task’85 of each individual case being decided on its own facts.  
As we pointed out above, the Australian High Court attempted to address this 
problem in the early part of the 20th century. In Chesterman’s Case, Issacs J 
endeavoured to give jurisprudential form to the popular notion of charitable 
purpose and give the concept flexibility. He proposed that a non-technical 
interpretation be adopted, pointing out that  
in the application of these rules minds easily differ. For instance, in Pemsel's Case 
Lord Halsbury and Lord Bramwell dissented. And one of the three eminent jurists 
who composed the majority, Lord Herschell, in the very next year – indeed within 
eight months afterwards – was led to a non-technical interpretation of the words 
‘charitable purpose’ in another Act.86 
The other majority judges agreed in this approach, but the Court was 
overruled by the Privy Council.87 The consequence is that one ‘hopeless task’ 
(each case being decided on its own facts, because of an apparent inability to 
give legal meaning to the popular concept of charity) has been replaced by 
another ‘hopeless task’ (each case being decided on its own facts because the 
courts are without an underlying jurisprudence to frame decision making).88  
 
3 Principle 3: A definition defines something89 
The definition should always be consistent with the matter defined. A good 
definition, at least in the classical sense, sets out the genus and differentia 
                                                
85  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 587 (Lord Macnaghten). 
86  Chesterman’s Case (1923) 32 CLR 362, 381–2 (Isaacs J) referring to Commissioners of Inland Revenue v 
Scott (1892) 2 QB 152 (‘Scott’s Case’). In Scott’s Case, Lord Herschell was again applying legislation 
that used the words ‘charitable purpose’. The Court took time to consider its verdict and Lord Herschell, 
having noted that the ‘appellants naturally placed their main reliance upon the decision of the House of 
Lords in the Commissioner of Income Tax v Pemsel’, was not willing to give the words such wide 
application: Scott’s Case (1892) 2 QB 152, 165. He found that this different drafting obliged a narrower 
construction: at 161, 165–6.  
87  Chesterman’s Case (1923) 32 CLR 362; Chesterman’s Case Appeal [1926] AC 128. The Privy Council 
cited Scott’s Case (1892) 2 QB 152 but did not accept the weight placed on it in the High Court’s reasons. 
The significance of this decision and the power of this argument remain. It must be noted: 1) that the 
decision also involved the interpretation of a taxation statute; 2) it is almost certainly the first discussion 
and application of the principles in Pemsel’s Case by an inferior court, the Court of Appeal; 3) Lord 
Herschell who was in the majority in Pemsel’s Case wrote the judgments with which Lord Lindley and 
Lord Kay unanimously concurred; and 4) there is not any reference to the ‘four principal divisions’. See 
Scott’s  Case (1892) 2 QB 152, 164–6.  
88  Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd [1951] AC 297, 305, 308–9 (Lord Simonds).  
89  Melville, above n 69, 10.  
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ensuring that all subcategories are mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive.90 At present, there is no ‘definition’ of charitable purpose. The 
popular meaning of charitable purpose as concern for others was sacrificed for 
certainty. In lay terms, charitable purpose has a subjective element that relates to 
motive.91 At law, by the adoption of the technical definition, the reference to 
motive is removed and charities are institutions that satisfy certain ‘objective’ 
criteria.92 Motive is critical, though, to understanding why public benefits are 
supplied. The law avoids assessing motive in charitable purpose matters by 
returning consistently to the Preamble. But as the doctrine of charitable purpose 
has become focused on the institution (not the characteristic of altruism) it bears 
little, if any, link to common understanding.  
If the legal class of charities does not represent social expectations of 
charitable purpose, what do citizens of common law countries expect to reside at 
the heart of this body of law? This problem was foreseen by Lord Chancellor 
Halsbury, who argued in his dissenting judgment in Pemsel’s Case for resisting 
the separation of the common from the technical meaning.93 The problem that 
arises from the separation is that the notions embedded in the words ‘charitable 
purpose’, which might have stood as the unifying or relating concept (the 
essence) that brings all of these heads of charitable purpose into relationship, has 
been lost. The orthodox jurisprudential theory is that referrable to the list in the 
Preamble, and if the inquiries have shown anything it is that this list is clearly 
inadequate.  
A specific problem with identifying the genus in the Preamble is that it is 
merely a list.94 A definition defines with reference to key characteristics – that is, 
the essence is elucidated.95 If it is helpful, the definer may state in the definition 
‘this definition includes …’. To be a definition, a list would have to be 
exhaustive. With the Preamble providing the foundation for the modern legal 
understanding of charitable purpose, there is the worst of both:96 the list is not 
exhaustive and there is no statement of the essential characteristics. Addressing 
this problem requires an exhaustive list, a clear definition, or a definition 
including a list.97  
A second specific problem with the present approach when considering the 
missing essence is that spirit and intendment, with reference to the Preamble or 
anything else, are ephemeral, opaque and uncertain concepts98 unsuited to legal 
analysis. As Lord Simonds noted: ‘A great body of law has thus grown up. Often 
                                                
90  See No 20 Cannon Street Ltd v Singer & Friedlander Ltd [1974] Ch 229, 240 (Megarry J).  
91  Dal Pont, above n 20, 33–4.  
92  Ibid 31–6; Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord Macnaghten).  
93  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 542. 
94  Charitable Trusts Committee (UK), Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to 
Charitable Trusts, Cmd 8710 (1952–53) 29, 31–6.  
95  R W M Dias, Jurisprudence (Butterworths, 5th ed, 1985) 3.  
96  That is not to say that it was the worst of both in 1601. The Preamble served its purpose then. It is its 
current usage that creates the problems.  
97  Secretary of State for the Home Department (UK), above n 2.  
98  Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 8, 7.  
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it may appear illogical and even capricious. It could hardly be otherwise when its 
guiding principle is so vaguely stated and liable to be so differently interpreted in 
different ages.’99  
A spirit may have character, but that character is not manifest or subject to 
legal obligation until incarnate in a legally recognised body. Then, the body is 
subject to the law, not the spirit. In the context of charities, these bodies take 
organisational form.  
Put at its simplest, there is a need for the law applying to these organisations 
to identify clearly the essence of organisations that are said to manifest charitable 
purposes. It is not enough, though, to identify essence. That which differentiates 
these organisations from others must also be delineated if the organisations are to 
be defined adequately. Differentiation is possible. The sector to which charities 
belong is but one sector – in fact, one part of a sector – of society. In disciplines 
other than law, charities are theorised as forming part of a third sector of 
society.100 At this point it is enough to note that charitable purpose is not defined. 
In the next section we consider reasons why.  
How then is the law to move beyond the Preamble? What was that 
overlooked jurisprudence? How should we craft a definition that does not depend 
upon a list or ‘spirit and intendment’? The path forward lies in the opinions in 
Pemsel’s Case. They point to an underlying jurisprudence. These ideas are 
developed through the next two sections. 
 
III   ALTRUISM 
Recall that Lord Macnaghten opined that the foundation of the concept of 
charitable use is not in the categories he listed, nor in the Preamble, per se, but in 
‘the piety of early times’.101 The legal significance of this ‘piety’, and its 
expression through pious uses or charitable purposes, was explored at some 
length by Lord Watson in Pemsel’s Case. We argue in this section that this legal 
conception is akin to, or has been replaced in common parlance by, the concept 
of altruism. The law of charities has not carried forward the foundational idea of 
‘piety’ despite its being as important to the concept of charitable purpose as 
public benefit was in Pemsel’s Case. Developing the idea from the opinions of 
Lords Watson, Herschell and Macnaghten, altruism could be theorised to 
discharge the function of ‘the piety of earlier times’ in charity law. It is to that 
project that we turn.  
                                                
99  Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426, 443 (Lord Simonds) and later at 446 when His Lordship states: ‘Here is 
something which is manifestly not susceptible of proof.’ 
100  Australian and New Zealand Third Sector Research, Submission No 252 to Charities Definition Inquiry, 
Inquiry into the Definition of Charities and Related Organisations, 19 January 2001; Dal Pont, above n 
20, 11–12; Martti Muukkonen, The Familiar Unknown – Introduction to Third Sector Theories 
(Licentiate Thesis, University of Joensuu, 2000); Mark Lyons, Third Sector: The Contribution of 
Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprises in Australia (Allen & Unwin, 2001).  
101  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 580 (Lord Macnaghten). 
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Defining ‘pious use’ in the context of the law as it was before the passing of 
the Statute of Charitable Uses is not as simple as may be thought at first. That is 
not because a simple legal definition cannot be set out, but rather because the bare 
definition without explanation denudes the idea of its very essence. It must be 
remembered that the idea of charity in the Preamble was anchored in notions of 
civil relations which preceded the present property rights discourse. It may seem 
strange in the 21
st
 century in a common law country to be focused on the use to 
which something is put rather than on the title or right to use. There is now a 
widely accepted belief that once something is ‘owned’ the owner may do as he or 
she pleases with it, regardless of moral constraints.
102
 The concept of pious use 
belongs to a different moral frame.103 The foundations for the ideas are Christian
104
 
and Augustine exemplified the expectation in a less well-known work directed to 
widows: ‘But in you let the love of riches grow cold … and let a pious use of what 
property you possess be directed to spiritual delights, that your liberality wax warm 
rather in helping such as are in want than in enriching covetous persons’.
105
 
Both words, ‘pious’ and ‘use’, are important. The ‘use’ must be directed to 
others who are in need. The motive must be ‘liberality’, which is contrasted with 
the self-interested ‘love of riches’, but this motive is known by its application of 
property to uses that benefit others. It is fundamentally a focus on the supply side 
of the transaction, but the reason for supply is manifest in the form of beneficiary 
to whom the transfer is made.
106
 
In such a context it is not surprising that Lord Watson, whose reasoning was 
accepted by a majority on this point,
107
 found not just public benefit but also 
‘pious’ motive to be integral to the concept of charitable purpose at law. He stated: 
So far as I am able to discover, ‘godly’ and ‘pious’ as applied to trusts or uses, had, 
in early times much the same significance in Scotland as in England. Their meaning 
was not limited to objects of a religious or eleemosynary character, but embraced all 
objects which a well-disposed person might promote from motives of 
philanthropy.
108 
                                                
102  Matthew Turnour, The Stewardship Paradigm: An Enquiry into the Ethical Obligation Associated with 
Being in Control of Resources (MA Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 1999) 48. 
103  F W Maitland, ‘The Origin of Uses’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Review 127.  
104  Although the Islamic concept of waqf may have significantly informed the development of the concept 
into charitable trusts. See Monica M Gaudiosi, ‘The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the 
Development of the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College’ (1988) 136 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Journal 1231.  
105  Saint Augustine, Of the Good of Widowhood (CL Cornish trans, Christian Literature Publishing Co, 
1887) [trans of: De Bono Viduitatis] <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1311.htm>. Cf Morice v Bishop 
of Durham [1805] 10 Ves Jr 522, disqualifying ‘liberality’ from the scope of charitable.  
106  See, eg, Pope John XXIII, Sacerdotii Nostri Primordia (1 August 1959) Papal Encyclicals Online 
<http://www.papalencyclicals.net/John23/j23sacer.htm>. 
107  Lord Halsbury concurred with the reasoning of Lord Watson on the meaning of godly and pious 
informing the understanding of charitable purpose: ‘That “godly” and “pious” are convertible terms, and 
may be so treated, is true’: Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 549. Lord Bramwell likewise agreed with the 
reasoning although he came to a different decision: at 563. Lord Herschell agreed with both Lord 
Watson’s reasoning and conclusion: at 574.  
108  Ibid 558 (Lord Watson) (emphasis added). 
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In relation to the word ‘pious’, Lord Watson gave three examples: ‘the 
building and repairing of bridges, repairing of churches or entertainment of the 
poor’.109 He referred also to the case of Lord Saltoun v Lady Pitsligo110 where 
‘the Court of Session held that the repair of a public harbour was a pious use’ 
within the meaning of the relevant legislation.111 His point was clear: if a ‘well-
disposed person’ was motivated by ‘philanthropy’ the courts could find 
charitable intent, as the traditional conception of pious use or godliness had broad 
application.112 Lord Watson did not just point to motives of philanthropy leading 
to the provision of physical needs, but also to motives to make contributions to 
religious,113 intellectual and moral culture.114 
Lord Herschell, whilst agreeing with Lord Macnaghten, wrote his own 
opinion. He also did not categorise charitable purposes, but referenced a motive 
of benevolence as integral to charitable purpose: ‘I think, then, that the popular 
conception of a charitable purpose covers the relief of any form of necessity, 
destitution, or helplessness which excites the compassion or sympathy of men, 
and so appeals to their benevolence for relief.’115  
His Lordship continued: 
Nor am I prepared to say that the relief of what is often termed spiritual destitution 
or need is excluded from this conception of charity. On the contrary, no 
insignificant portion of the community consider what are termed spiritual 
necessities as not less imperatively calling for relief, and regard the relief of them 
not less as a charitable purpose than the ministering to physical needs … It is a 
mistake to suppose that men limit their use of the word ‘charity’ to those forms of 
benevolent assistance which they deem to be wise, expedient, and for the public 
good. There is no common consent in this country as to the kind of assistance 
which it is to the public advantage that men should render to their fellows, or as to 
the relative importance of the different forms which this assistance takes.116 
Our point is that pious uses or charitable purposes are not just public 
benefiting purposes. They also have, as a central dimension, the motive to serve 
others. This is not the orthodox reading of the law as it presently stands.117 
Ignoring motive is justified under the doctrine of charitable purpose by focusing 
entirely on the side of the recipient, the demand side, not on the supplier. 
Looking at the supply side as well as the demand side overcomes the problems 
arising from a focus on public benefit alone. It is an approach that has assisted 
economists,118 and can assist lawyers.  
                                                
109  Ibid 559 (Lord Watson). 
110  Mor Dict 9948. 
111  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 559 (Lord Watson). 
112  Ibid 558 (Lord Watson). 
113  Ibid. 
114  Ibid 561 (Lord Watson). 
115  Ibid 572 (Lord Herschell). 
116  Ibid (emphasis added).  
117  Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 7. 
118  Avner Ben-Ner and Theresa van Hoomissen, ‘Nonprofit Organisations in the Mixed Economy: A 
Demand and Supply Analysis’ (1991) 62 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 519; Richard 
Steinberg, ‘Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organisations’, in Walter W Powell and Richard Steinberg 
(eds), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Yale University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 117.  
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Pious use is an antiquated concept.119 The closest contemporary equivalent is 
altruism. George Lewes introduced the word ‘altruism’ into the English language 
in 1853 with his translation of Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences.120 The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines altruism as: ‘Disinterested or selfless concern for the 
well-being of others, esp. as a principle of action. Opposed to selfishness, [or] 
egoism.’121 In theoretical analysis, it is part of a broader class called ‘prosocial 
behaviour’.122 If altruism is accepted as a rough equivalent of the pious use, 
which was central to the jurisprudence, we have a name for the uniqueness of the 
space without reference to the ‘spirit and intendment’ of the Preamble or the four 
heads of Pemsel’s Case. The Preamble no longer has any legislative force in 
Australia,123 Canada and other common law countries, and the time has come to 
let it go.124 If the quest for its ‘spirit and intendment’ is replaced in part by 
altruism, and if the economic and social sciences have methods of identifying 
and possibly even measuring altruism, then jurisprudence can draw upon those 
insights to shape the development of the law in this area. 
Two final comments should be made before closing this section. First, 
charities often charge fees and frequently conduct businesses. Do these activities 
demonstrate a lack of altruism? The High Court recently answered this question 
in the negative in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Word Investments Ltd.125 
In that case the Court reminded the Commissioner of Taxation that it is the 
purpose for which the activity is pursued and not the activity itself that is the 
focus of investigation for ‘charitable’. Altruism must be evidenced in the 
purpose. What though of education if it ‘goes beyond what is necessary to meet 
any “charitable need” for education’ and what is actually being provided is 
‘“gold-plated” education at a cost which is unaffordable for the vast majority’?126 
Again the test does not change. There may need to be careful attention given to 
whether the school operates for private or public benefit, but as a matter of 
principle this is not excessively problematic.127   
                                                
119  Maitland, above n 103.  
120  George Henry Lewes, Comte’s Philosophy of the Sciences (Bohn, 1890). Comte appears to have invented 
the word, possibly drawing upon a French legal phrase alteri huic: see Helmut K Anheier and Regina A 
List, A Dictionary of Civil Society, Philanthropy and the Non-Profit Sector (Routledge, 2005) 6.  
121 ‘Definition of “Altruism”’, The Oxford English Dictionary (online ed) <http://dictionary.oed.com> 
(emphasis in original). When using the term, Comte intended ‘to establish the opposite reference point to 
the self-gratifying, utility-maximizing “economic man” of economic theory’: Anheier and List, above n 
120, 6.  
122  Graham M Vaughan and Michael A Hogg, Introduction to Social Psychology (Prentice Hall, 1998) 324; 
David R Shaffer, Social and Personality Development (Wadsworth, 2000) 306.  
123  For discussion of history generally see: Dal Pont, above n 20, 79–126.  
124  See also Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v Minister of National Revenue 
[1999] 1 SCR 10, particularly Gonthier J dissenting at 40–3 [32]–[36] and Central Bayside General 
Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168, 200–4 (Kirby J). Note 
however, its incorporation into statute in England and Wales: Charities Act 2011 (UK) c 25, ss 
3(1)(m)(ii)–(iii). 
125  (2008) 236 CLR 204, 224–8 [35]–[45]. 
126  Independent Schools Council Case [2012] Ch 214, 232 [32]. 
127  Ibid 282 [213]–[214]. 
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The second issue is that there is a view, traceable to Henry Hansmann’s 
work, that the non-distribution constraint, not altruism, is the critical indicator. 
Our response to that is two-fold. First, Hansmann acknowledged the existence of 
trusts, unincorporated associations and other legal forms but made it clear that he 
was limiting his discussion to analysis of corporations in the United States.128 A 
broader concept is required to apply more generally to trusts and unincorporated 
associations; we suggest that altruism is that concept. Second, we suggest that the 
non-distribution constraint is better understood as a sign of altruism. We are 
basing this approach on more recent American scholarship from Rob Atkinson (a 
student of Hansmann) who built a more comprehensive model on Hansmann’s 
framework, stating that altruism is ‘the continental divide in the nonprofit 
sphere’.129 
We conclude this section noting that just as the ‘spirit and intendment’ did 
not stand alone but operated in collaboration with public benefit, so altruism does 
not stand alone, but works in conjunction with public benefit. We suggest that a 
third dimension, voluntarism, is also needed to complete this theory 
development, and we consider this next.  
 
IV   VOLUNTARISM 
Something provided voluntarily is something that is not provided under 
coercion. Citizens provide funds for public benefiting purposes when they pay 
taxes, but that provision of funds is not in pursuit of a charitable purpose. As 
Lord Macnaghten famously pointed out, ‘a layman would probably be amused if 
he were told that a gift to the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the benefit of the 
nation was a charity’.130 However, it is not an absolute rule that a gift to 
government cannot be charitable. That is, in some cases a gift to government can 
be charitable. In Pemsel’s Case Lord Chancellor Halsbury cited a number of 
authorities to that effect.131 In Re Cain, a gift to the Victorian Department of 
Health was held to be for a charitable purpose.132 Nevertheless, there is a clear 
dividing line at common law between organisations pursuing charitable purposes 
and governments.133 Charitable purpose is characterised by voluntariness. That is 
not to say that all charitable work is undertaken by people voluntarily. It is to say 
that the public benefiting purpose is pursued separately from the coercive control 
of the state. People give to, and participate in pursuing charitable purposes 
voluntarily – that is, they are not compelled to by governments. It is the motive 
                                                
128  Henry Hansmann, ‘Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law’ (1981) 129 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 500, 502. 
129  Rob Atkinson, ‘Altruism in Nonprofit Organisations’ (1990) 31 Boston College Law Review 501, 509. 
130  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 584 (Lord Macnaghten). 
131  Ibid 544. 
132  Re Cain (dec’d); The National Trustees Executors Agency Co of Australasia Ltd v Jeffrey [1950] VLR 
382, 387. 
133  Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 
168, 185–6 [40]–[44]. 
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for the gift or the participation, not the manner in which the public is benefited, 
that distinguishes charitable from government purposes. Justice Gonthier 
summarised the law on this point in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible 
Minority Women: 
Two central principles have long been embedded in the case law. Speaking of the 
existing Pemsel categories, Rand J. observed … that ‘the attributes attaching to all 
are their voluntariness and, directly or indirectly, their reflex on public welfare’. 
These two principles, namely, (1) voluntariness (or what I shall refer to as 
altruism, that is, giving to third parties without receiving anything in return other 
than the pleasure of giving); and (2) public welfare or benefit in an objectively 
measurable sense, underlie the existing categories of charitable purposes, and 
should be the touchstones guiding their further development.134  
Justice Gonthier (one of three dissenting judges) effectively equated 
voluntariness and altruism. The majority judgment written by Iacobucci J cites 
the same passage from Rand J, finding that public benefit alone is insufficient, 
and pointing to the need for recognition of ‘the “generic character” of charity’.135 
We suggest that this ‘generic character’ of charity, distinct from public benefit 
(in this analysis) is made up of two parts: altruism and voluntariness.136 Further, 
we suggest that nothing is lost by referring to voluntariness and altruism as 
coterminous when considering the role of charitable purpose as one of 
determining favour. For theoretical clarity though, when defining charities for the 
purposes of enabling or regulating we contend it is helpful to keep them separate. 
Charities are distinguished from government by voluntariness, but it is altruism 
that distinguishes them from businesses. 
If the provision of a good is coerced by government, then it is not supplied 
charitably. Coercion by peers, social standards and religious obligation does not 
disqualify a supply from being for charitable purpose. Only legally compelled 
coercion is actually not voluntary for the purposes of this analysis. How much 
government coercion is tolerable, though, for a purpose to remain charitable?137 
Some funding and perhaps some contributions of time flow from coercion. A 
most obvious example is where civil society organisations pursuing community 
service purposes are entirely funded by government and subject to detailed 
compliance requirements and directions (set out in the form of a contract or other 
form of arrangement).138 Does this remove the requisite voluntariness? The 
answer we propose is that there must be a continuum and the criterion will not be 
fundamentally different from that applied when considering altruism. The 
difference is that the test will be voluntariness as identified by absence of 
                                                
134  Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v Minister of National Revenue [1999] 1 
SCR 10, 43–4 [37].  
135  Ibid 106 [148], citing Donovan W M Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (Carswell, 2nd ed, 1984) 550. 
136  Cf Independent Schools Council Case [2012] Ch 214, where the Upper Tribunal considered ‘public 
benefit in the first sense’ and ‘public benefit in the second sense’: at 235–6 [44] and subsequent 
discussions in sections C and D of the decision.  
137  Dal Pont, above n 20; Matthew Harding, ‘Distinguishing Government from Charity in Australian Law’ 
(2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 559, 559. 
138  See Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 
168, 181. 
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coercion, not altruism as evidenced by absence of self-interest. At some point or 
points between the entirely voluntary pursuit of purposes and entirely coerced 
pursuit of those same purposes, a threshold will be crossed. That threshold will 
mark the boundary between charities and government.  
There is a growing science in the measurement of altruism.139 At the most 
basic level, it can be measured by volunteering. The United Nations sets out a 
method for valuing volunteer labour input in national accounts, having regard to 
the two presently dominant methods: opportunity cost and market or replacement 
cost.140 There are clear indicia of coercion. We suggest that if altruism and 
voluntarism can be identified and measured, then theory development could 
progress significantly, even into quantitative measurement if the Preamble is 
abandoned and replaced by these concepts.141 This is not to oblige theory 
development to move to complex measurement, but it is foreseeable under this 
approach that legislators determining tax law may draw upon quantitative 
analysis of both altruism and voluntariness.142 This is because altruism could be 
measured in some way. Coercion could be identified by reference to such things 
as the capacity to oblige participation, to require allocation of funds to particular 
objects, or compel delivery of charitable goods.  
What of the role of voluntarism in defining the gateway to favours? If 
altruism and voluntarism can be conceptualised as on a continuum, then 
jurisdictions may differ as to the evidence of altruism and voluntarism needed to 
access favour. Altruism and voluntarism could be utilised to assess access to 
favours. We suggest a simpler approach. Provided the requisite threshold of 
altruistic and voluntary supply is evident,143 public benefit can be the gauge that 
allows differentiation between charitable purposes. This is a simpler approach 
and different levels of public benefit are evident in the cases for different 
charitable purposes.144  
 
                                                
139  See, eg, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, Handbook on 
Non-Profit Institutions in the System of National Accounts, UN Doc ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/91 (2003) 69.  
140  Ibid. See also Matthias Benz, ‘Not for the Profit, but for the Satisfaction? Evidence on Worker Well-
Being in Non-Profit Firms’ (2005) 58 Kyklos 155.   
141  For example, at the most basic level, altruism can be measured by volunteering.  
142  Matthew Dwight Turnour, Beyond Charity: Outlines of a Jurisprudence for Civil Society (PhD Thesis, 
Queensland University of Technology, 2009) 335.  
143  Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v Minister of National Revenue [1999] 1 
SCR 10, 43 [37]. 
144  Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley (Trustees of the Newtown Trust) [1955] AC 572, 591 
(Viscount Simonds) (‘IRC v Baddeley’). 
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V   PUBLIC BENEFIT 
Charities are granted favours because they provide public benefits.145 In 
common law countries there are at least two significant fiscal favours: income tax 
exemption,146 and tax deductibility for donations.147 However, there is no basis in 
common law countries for segmenting within charitable purposes to justify 
access to one form of favour but not to another. This is a problem. After the Privy 
Council thwarted the Australian High Court in this common law development, 
Parliament responded in 1927 with legislation that distinguished between classes 
of charity entitled only to exemption and those also able to give tax deductible 
receipts.148 South Africa repealed reference to ‘charitable’ as a ground for 
exemption on 19 July 2000. It elected to reference and define ‘public benefit 
organisation’ and allow deductibility for specific expenditures such as 
environmental waste disposal.149 India is expected to abandon reference to 
‘charitable’ when its new Direct Taxes Code 2010 comes into effect (this was 
expected to be on 1 April 2012).150 In Ireland, where the most recent legislative 
additions have been made, the legislation defining charities is expressly stated 
not to have fiscal impact.151 If public benefit could be theorised in ways that 
enabled differentiation between different charitable purposes, the concept of 
charitable purpose could be employed more usefully in a fiscal context, and 
additional categories of organisation or abandoning the reference to charitable 
might not be necessary.  
We suggest that charitable purposes can be segmented for jurisprudential 
purposes according to the extent and nature of the public benefit. By extent we 
mean the extent to which a purpose is for public benefit. By nature we mean 
classification into categories of public benefit according to qualities. Both of 
these forms of classification seem evident in the cases and therefore we 
endeavour to theorise both. The simpler of the two is the extent to which public 
benefit is evident and we begin with that. When turning to classification it is 
                                                
145  Picarda, above n 19, 29–30; Warburton, Morris and Riddle, above n 43, 7; Charity Commission for 
England and Wales, Charities and Public Benefit: The Charity Commission’s General Guidance on 
Public Benefit (2008); Charity Commission for England and Wales, Commentary on the Descriptions of 
Charitable Purpose in the Charities Act 2006 (2007); P S Atiyah, ‘Public Benefit in Charities’ (1958) 21 
Modern Law Review 138.  
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Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC §501(c)(3); Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ) s CW36; Income Tax Act 2007 
(UK) c 3, ss 414–46; Income Tax Act, RSC 1985 (5th Supp), c 1,  ss 110.1, 118.1, 149.1(f).  
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501(c)(3); Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ) ss BD 2, DV 8, DV 9; Income Tax Act 2007 (UK) c 3, ss 521–523; 
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148  Ann O’Connell, ‘Charitable Treatment? – A (Potted) History of the Taxation of Charities in Australia’ 
(Paper presented at the Tax History Conference 2010, Cambridge, 5–6 July 2010) 21. 
149  Income Tax Act 1962 (South Africa) ss 10(1)(cN), 30(1), 37B; see also Dal Pont, above n 20, 534. 
150  Direct Taxes Code Bill 2009 (India); see also Karla W Simon, ‘International Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Non-Profit Organizations’ (2010) 44 International Lawyer 399, fn 34; Noshir H 
Dadrawala, ‘Difficult Times Ahead for Charities in India’ (2009) 7(4) International Journal of Civil 
Society Law 57. 
151  Charities Act 2009 (Ireland) s 7(1). 
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evident, though, that the extent of public benefit informs categories, so the theory 
regarding the nature of the benefit is informed by and builds from the discussion 
of the extent of the benefit. 
 
A   A Continuum of Public Benefit 
At its simplest, the extent of public benefit could be assessed on a continuum. 
The economist Burton Weisbrod has proposed a ‘collectiveness index’ as a 
theoretical tool for assessing public benefit as a justification for favoured 
treatment.152 More evidence of public benefit gives greater entitlement to favour. 
This is a very simple, but arguably effective, framework for progressing 
jurisprudential development.  
Progressing in this way provides a way to address problems around the 
concept of public benefit, which are compounded by statutorily added heads of 
charitable purpose.153 With only four heads of charitable purpose at common law, 
the concept of public benefit became a deep-rooted problem.154 It was not 
possible to state clearly what public benefit was and what it was not. The 
delimiters of public benefit did not work.155 There were problems with the levels 
of public benefit.156 If there are 13 heads of charitable purpose, as now in 
England and Wales, and each head must prove public benefit but all are different, 
then how is public benefit to be theorised? In response to these problems, we 
suggest that it is possible to maintain one concept of benefit for charitable 
purposes and to theorise it as a continuum between private and public benefit.  
Such a continuum is a logical development from the hierachy which is 
already the accepted law, set out in the charitable purpose cases. It is well 
established that the doctrine of charitable purpose ranked contributions to public 
benefit in a hierarchical way.157 The oft cited authority is the House of Lords 
decision in IRC v Baddeley where Viscount Simonds flagged the so-called ‘poor 
relations cases’ – which have such a narrow requirement of public benefit as to 
                                                
152  Burton A Weisbrod, ‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy’ in 
Burton A Weisbrod (ed), The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector: An Economic Analysis (DC Heath, 1977) 51, 
73.  
153  See, eg, Extension of Charitable Purpose Act 2004 (Cth); Charities Act 1979 (Barbados) c 243; Charities 
Act 2006 (UK) c 50; Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 (Scot); Charities Act 
(Northern Ireland) 2008 (NI); Charities Act 2009 (Ireland). 
154  Peter Smith, ‘Religious Charities and the Charities Act 2006’ (2007) 9(3) Charity Law and Practice 
Review 57.  
155  IRC v Baddeley [1955] AC 572, 590 (Viscount Simonds); Independent Committee of Inquiry to Examine 
the Effect of Charity Law and Practice on Voluntary Organisations, National Council of Social Service, 
Charity Law and Voluntary Organisations: Report (1976) 2; Picarda, above n 19, 31; Wino van Veen, 
‘Public Benefit from a Comparative Perspective’ in Paul Bater, Frits Hondius and Penina Kessler Lieber 
(eds), The Tax Treatment of NGOs: Legal, Ethical and Fiscal Frameworks for Promoting NGOs and 
Their Activities (Kluwer, 2004) 239, 248; John Colombo, ‘In Search of Private Benefit’ (2006) 58 
Florida Law Review 1063, 1065; Cheung Man Yu v Lau Yuen Ching [2007] 4 HKC 314; Smith, above n 
154, 70; Gino Dal Pont, Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 2000) 16.  
156  Smith, above n 154; Ong, above n 80, 349; Kerry O'Halloran, Charity Law and Social Inclusion: An 
International Study (Routledge, 2007) 172. 
157  Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426, 449. 
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be ostensibly private – and noted that ‘a different degree of public benefit is 
requisite according to the class in which the charity is said to fall’.158 He held that 
if a purpose was to fall within ‘the fourth class [other purposes beneficial to the 
community],  it must be for the benefit of the whole community or at least of all 
the inhabitants of a sufficient area’.159 He warned that failure to take such a broad 
view of the fourth head was to fail to recognise that ‘here is a slippery slope’.160  
The idea of juxtaposing public and private benefit as antitheses on a 
continuum is also embedded in legislation in some common law countries. In the 
United States, private inurement is a disqualification from income tax 
exemption.161 In New Zealand, private benefit is expressly listed as disqualifying 
an organisation from exemption.162 
In summary, the common law has a long history of having one class of public 
benefit, but assessing it in different ways according to the charitable purpose in 
question. It is a logical development of the law to theorise public benefit as on a 
continuum and to link entitlement to favour to the degree of public benefit. It is 
also conceptually sound to see private benefit as its antithesis. 
Once the concept of a continuum is accepted it does not matter whether there 
are three heads, 13 heads or any other number of heads of charitable purpose. 
The question is only where on the continuum between private and public benefit 
the threshold for entitlement to favour is satisfied for a particular expression of 
charitable purpose. Some purposes, such as relieving poverty, may be deemed 
sufficiently public to be charitable despite conferring a more private benefit than 
would be acceptable for other purposes such as advancement of education.  
 
B   Categories of Public Benefit 
Different expressions of charitable purpose require different levels of public 
benefit. Looked at another way, this means that public benefit is divisible into 
different levels, having regard to the expression of charitable purpose. In this 
section we suggest that Lord Macnaghten’s four ‘principal divisions’ of 
charitable purpose – categories of purposes accepted as within the spirit and 
intendment of the Preamble – can be simplified and expanded into three 
categories of public benefit. Those categories link to whether the benefit is 
private, quasi-public or public. A number of comments will help by way of 
introduction. 
First, Lord Macnaghten said the classification into ‘four principal divisions’ 
was ‘academical’, so, in and of themselves, his reasons provide freedom to 
reclassify.163 Second, it is often overlooked that Lord Watson and Lord Herschell, 
who also comprised the majority, categorised charitable purposes differently. The 
four principal divisions are not the only framework emanating from Pemsel’s 
                                                
158  IRC v Baddeley [1955] AC 572, 590. 
159  Ibid. 
160  Ibid 591. 
161  IRC § 501(c)(3). 
162  Income Tax Act 2007 (NZ) s CW 42(1)(c). 
163  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 584 (Lord Macnaghten). 
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Case and it is appropriate to bear in mind our earlier discussion in this context. 
Third, as William James observed, categorising is ‘teleological’, and this is as 
true in law as any other discipline.164 Concepts are ordered and arranged having 
regard to the similarities or differences chosen at the particular time for the 
particular purpose. It follows from these three observations that, given the level 
of dissatisfaction with the present law, revisiting the purpose of the arrangement 
is appropriate.  
The 20th century French philosopher Michel Foucault used the image of 
things arranged on a table to conceptualise the way people bring order to 
things.165 His point was that order is capable of alternatives. We suggest that the 
charitable purposes cases can be re-organised into three categories. That is, 
favour is extended to charities when they supply charitable goods: 
1. that Deal with Disadvantage; 
2. that Encourage Edification; or  
3. that Facilitate Freedom. 
Across the next three sections we will explain these terms and why they are 
collectively exhaustive, although not mutually exclusive categories. We will also 
explain how these ideas are developed from the underlying charity law 
jurisprudence and are more useful than the four heads set out in Pemsel’s Case. 
 
VI   TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATION OF 
PUBLIC BENEFIT: FROM RELIEF OF POVERTY TO DEALING 
WITH DISADVANTAGE 
Relief of poverty is the first head of charitable purpose from Pemsel’s Case, 
but conceptually poverty is just one form of disadvantage. There are many forms 
of disadvantage and addressing these is frequently recognised as the pursuit of a 
charitable purpose.166 Why? We contend it is because by dealing with a 
disadvantage, such as poverty, the citizen helped is able to enjoy equally with 
other citizens the benefits and burdens of citizenship. As it is referrable to the 
state of other citizens, it is to be expected that indicia of disadvantage will 
include jurisdiction. Thus the standard to be satisfied for a person to be 
considered at a disadvantage in a highly developed economy such as the United 
                                                
164  William James, The Principles of Psychology (Encyclopaedia Britannica, first published 1890, 1991 ed) 
670. 
165  Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage, 1994) xvii 
[trans of: Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines (first published 1966)].  
166  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 571–2 (Lord Herschell):  
  Many examples may, I think, be given of endowments for the relief of human necessities, which would be as 
generally termed charities as hospitals or almshouses, where, nevertheless, the necessities to be relieved do not 
result from poverty in its limited sense of the lack of money. … [I]t is not pecuniary destitution that creates the 
necessity which such a society is designed to relieve. It is the helplessness of those who are the objects of its care 
which evokes the assistance of the benevolent.  
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States might be quite different from the standard in a relatively poor developing 
country; the international standard of US$1.25 might apply.167 
Brooks traces the foundation of the common law’s jurisprudential obligation 
to equality under the law to Cicero.168 If the common law is taken to have a 
commitment to equality, then granting favours to those who voluntarily relieve 
and prevent poverty and thus assist the weak to join with the strong in society is 
to encourage that which the law itself deigns. In more recent years these ideas 
have found expression in language of social inclusion and social cohesion,169 but 
they are ancient concepts deeply embedded in the common law. It becomes a 
function of citizens of goodwill to endeavour to lift all other citizens up so that 
they may enjoy that equality. This form of charitable good we call Dealing with 
Disadvantage.  
When Dealing with Disadvantage by the supply of goods, it is enough to 
supply private goods to individual persons at a disadvantage. Relief of poverty is 
the genesis of this category, but it is not appropriate to limit it to relief of poverty 
because poverty is only one kind of disadvantage. The broader class of 
organisation recognised as Dealing with Disadvantage would include ‘the relief 
of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship 
or other disadvantage’ (added by statute in England and Wales)170 and ‘open and 
nondiscriminatory self help groups’ (added by statute as recognised charitable 
purposes for federal laws in Australia).171 
The class is similar to that recommended by Kelley, who has called for a 
class of charity ‘whose mission and resources are devoted exclusively to serving 
the poor’.172 Writing in a United States context, where charities ‘live in fear of 
being ensnared by confusing and contradictory legal doctrines such as the 
operational test, the commerciality doctrine, the unrelated business income tax ... 
and the commensurate-in-scope doctrine’173 the need to find ways to reform this 
body of law is particularly acute.174 We argue, though, for a broader class on the 
basis that it is important to recognise that the class is confined to persons at a 
disadvantage. One of the problems with the purpose known as relief of poverty is 
that it could be invoked if someone had ‘to “go short” in the ordinary acceptation 
                                                
167  Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion, ‘More Relatively-Poor People in a Less Absolutely-Poor World’ 
(Policy Research Working Paper No 6114, World Bank Development Research Group, July 2012) 7. For 
US methods to measure poverty, see United States Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures 
Poverty (12 September 2012) 
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208. 
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170  Charities Act 2006 (UK) c 50, s 2(2).  
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174  Ibid 2440. 
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of that term, due regard being had to their status in life’.175 Within this alternative 
jurisprudence, disadvantage must be established sufficient to invoke the law’s 
intervention to advance equality.  
Beyond advancing equality there is a second reason why Dealing with 
Disadvantage, even for only one person, is for public benefit in common law 
countries in the 21st century. It is because governments in most common law 
countries take responsibility for this seemingly private provision by welfare 
payments. At the most basic level, therefore, the public benefits when 
governments do not have to supply the need. It makes sense, then, that the law 
would favour organisations which are the vehicles for Dealing with Disadvantage 
– at least to the extent that this reduces the burden on government. This argument 
is at its clearest in the context of the supply of private goods, but it applies 
generally to all goods supplied by civil society organisations that would 
otherwise have been supplied by goverment. As Ware stated pithily: ‘charities 
are an excellent instrument for making government cheaper’.176 
There is then one category: Dealing with Disadvantage; but it does not cover 
the field of charitable purpose. At least one other category of purpose is needed, 
that goes beyond the supply of private goods to Deal with Disadvantage.  
 
VII   FROM ADVANCEMENT OF EDUCATION TO 
ENCOURAGING EDIFICATION 
Advancement of education is the second head of charitable purpose drawn 
from Lord Macnaghten’s opinion in Pemsel’s Case. Conceptually, however, 
advancement of education is just one purpose that finds expression in the supply 
of quasi-public good that ‘benefit[s] the rich as well as the poor’.177 We suggest 
that advancement of education, and many of the other purposes that are 
recognised as charitable under the fourth head, are recognised because they 
belong to a broad category of purposes that are pursued with the aim of edifying 
society. People work voluntarily to build up society through charities. If that is 
so, then a category of purposes that centre on community development by the 
provision of quasi-public goods, benefiting both rich and poor,178 is required. 
Lord Watson identified the class with reference to ‘intellectual and moral culture’ 
and seemed to incorporate advancement of religion.179 We call this category 
Encouraging Edification. We acknowledge the view of the House of Lords in 
Gilmour v Coats that evidence of ‘edification by example’ by a closed religious 
order was ‘something too vague and intangible to satisfy the prescribed [public 
                                                
175  Re Coulthurst; Coutts & Co v Colthurst [1951] Ch 661, 666.  
176  Alan Ware, Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organizations in Britain and the United States (Polity 
Press, 1989) 142. 
177  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord Macnaghten). 
178  Ibid. 
179  Ibid 557–9 (Lord Watson). 
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benefit] test’ necessary to establish charitable purpose.180 We are not dealing 
here, however, with either the class of religion nor the evidence of public benefit. 
We are proposing a label for a class that is less intangible than advancement of 
religion, which is developed from advancement of education. It is suggested as a 
useful label to describe what Lord Watson referred to as ‘intellectual and moral 
culture’. 
To be Encouraging Edification, a purpose must demonstrate that its 
advancement leads to a greater measure of public benefit than Dealing with 
Disadvantage. Encouraging Edification calls for greater publicness in either the 
good supplied or the class of recipient. For a purpose to fit this category, the 
enjoyment of the benefit must be ‘socialised’ at least to sections of communities 
which are sufficiently large to be considered public.181 Examples are purposes 
that involve the provision of social goods such as public art and other cultural 
activities, including public libraries, public art galleries and museums, which are 
recognised as charitable. We theorise that it also involves the provision of 
physical infrastructure that literally ‘edifies’ a community, such as the ‘Bridges 
Portes Havens Causwaies … Seabanks and Highewaies’ enumerated in the 
Preamble.182  
The socialisation of goods suggests communal sharing and so we suggest that 
favouring purposes that pursue this edifying role is justified because it advances 
fraternity. We suggest advancement of fraternity must at least include purposes 
that edify the ‘intellectual and moral culture’. Advancement of religion is also 
justifiable on this basis, but we will discuss this purpose in more detail below.183 
Fraternity is a value that may take different forms in different common law 
countries. Montesquieu noted, and it is worth remembering that, ‘[t]he laws of 
education will be … different in each species of government: in monarchies they 
will have honour for their object; in republics, virtue; in despotic governments, 
fear’.184 Applying this observation to the current debate over the supply of 
charitable goods, the point is that what a particular community will wish to 
encourage and consequently, how it justifies favour, will vary according to its 
form of government. Different nations value public goods differently. The 
broader principles will be consistent, though: to be entitled to favour under this 
head, a charity must benefit people, which means at least a sector of the 
community and not just an individual. Second, and importantly for Encouraging 
Edification, the charitable good supplied may be enjoyed by the rich as well as 
the poor (as the object is advancement of fraternity not equality).185 Having 
regard to the economic discourse, for the charity to be entitled to favour on this 
basis the good supplied should be both non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  
                                                
180  Gilmour v Coats [1949] AC 426, 446 (Lord Simonds). 
181  Re Pinion; Westminster Bank Ltd v Pinion [1965] Ch 85, 104; Atkinson, above n 129, 565–6. 
182  Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz 1 c 4, Preamble.  
183  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 557–9 (Lord Watson). 
184  Baron Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (Thomas Nugent trans, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1992) 13 [trans of: De l’esprit des lois (first published 1748)]. 
185  See Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583–4.  
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The category Encouraging Edification is the logical development of the third 
head, advancement of education, and an extended fourth head. Elephant rides for 
children have been accepted within the education category.186 It will also be 
recalled that the fourth head is simply a grab bag overflowing with purposes that 
clearly benefit larger groups of people. We mentioned that advancement of 
religion could be subsumed in this category. However, we suggest that religion 
plays a broader function; and more generally, that all of the purposes recognised 
as charitable cannot be explained adequately as Dealing with Disadvantage or 
Encouraging Edification. Accordingly, we propose a third class which we call 
Facilitating Freedom. 
 
VIII FROM ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION TO 
FACILITATING FREEDOM 
We theorise that a third class of charitable purpose extends beyond 
organisations pursuing the advancement of religion, to other organisations that 
similarly contribute to the common wealh. Whilst Pemsel’s Case was limited to 
the narrow religious activity of evangelism, we suggest there is a broader concept 
underlying the favourable treatment of religion in charity law that is developed 
from the role of religion in society. Our starting point is De Tocqueville’s 
observation with reference to the role of religion in the United States: ‘Thus, 
while the law permits the Americans to do what they please, religion prevents 
them from conceiving, and forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust.’187 His 
point was that religion operated as a moral restraint on unbridled freedom, to 
ensure that people in that newly democratic nation exercised their liberty as they 
should, that is having regard to others. Three 19th century American cases 
discussed by Picarda ground this broad idea in the common law’s favouring 
advancement of religion as a charitable purpose.188 The advancement of religion 
is quintessentially for public benefit in that it encourages concern for others and 
self restraint, which are the foundations of civilisation and the welfare of society. 
In Holland v Peck, the Court stated that religion was ‘the surest basis on which to 
rest the superstructure of social order’.189 In People ex rel Seminary of Our Lady 
of Angels v Barber, religion was described as necessary to the advancement of 
civilisation and the promotion of the welfare of society.190 In Gass and Bonta v 
Wilhite, it was said that religion is a ‘valuable constituent in the character of our 
citizens’.191 In such a context, advancement of religion is recognised as a 
                                                
186  Re Lopes; Bence-Jones v Zoological Society of London [1931] 2 Ch 130, 136. 
187  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (George Lawrence trans, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1992) 
[trans of: De la démocratie en Amérique (first published 1835)]. 
188  Picarda, above n 19, 92. 
189  Holland v Peck, 37 NC 255, 258 (1842).  
190  People ex rel Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v Barber, 3 NY St Rep 367 (1886); affirmed in People ex 
rel Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v Barber, 13 NE 936 (1887).  
191  Gass and Bonta v Wilhite, 32 Ky 170, 180 (1834).  
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charitable purpose, enjoying favour because of its role in underpinning the social 
order and building social cohesion.192  
These charitable purpose cases, read in the context of the common law 
history, point to advancement of religion cases forming part of a wider stream of 
common law jurisprudence related to the foundations of society. It is not just UK 
reformers, American judges and Picarda who draw this connection.193 Chief 
Justice Gleeson of the High Court has declared that ‘[r]eligion is one method of 
bridging that gap’ between individual belief and community values: it is ‘the 
general acceptance of values that sustains the law, and social behaviour; not 
private conscience’.194 Similar observations were made by the Charities 
Definition Inquiry.195  
Chief Justice Barwick, in holding that the publication of law reports was a 
charitable purpose, explained that fortification of the foundations of society is 
fundamentally a public benefit:  
The sustenance of the law is a benefit of a material kind which enures for the 
benefit of the whole community … [I]t is true that the society cannot exist as such 
if it is not based upon and protected by justice under law: and nurtured by 
obedience to law.196  
However, negative aspects of religion sometimes warrant certain religious 
organisations being denied access to favours.197 Advancement of religion was not 
listed in the Preamble in 1601, and there has been debate over whether it should 
be retained as a charitable purpose.198 There is also a growing tension between 
religious favours enjoyed in charity law and human rights law.199 We argue 
below that a distinction can be drawn between freedom of religious association as 
a charitable purpose that justifies favour on the one hand, and simple freedom of 
religious association that does not warrant favour on the other. This distinction 
may assist in resolving some of the tensions between human rights law and 
religious favours, as it may be possible to limit favour to religion without limiting 
religious freedom by reference to principles that transcend religion. Importantly, 
adopting this broader approach provides a justification for denial of that favour 
on a basis other than religion. 
                                                
192  Dal Pont, above n 20, 235, 239–40. 
193  Picarda, above n 19, 92. 
194  Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘The Relevance of Religion’ (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 93, 95; see 
also H R Sorensen and A K Thompson, ‘The Advancement of Religion is Still a Valid Charitable Object 
in 2001’ (Paper presented at the Charity Law in the Pacific Rim Conference, Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane, 4–6 October 2001) 15.  
195  Charities Definition Inquiry, above n 8, 175. See also Dal Pont, above n 20, 214–18.  
196  Incorporated Council of Law Reporting (Qld) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 659, 
669. The references are set out in context below. 
197  Senate Economics Legislation Committee, above n 7.  
198  Brian Lucas and Anne Robinson, ‘Religion as a Head of Charity’ in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and 
Kerry O’Halloran (eds), Modernising Charity Law: Recent Developments and Future Directions (Edward 
Elgar, 2010) 187, 192, 198–200. See also E B Bromley and K Bromley, ‘John Pemsel Goes to the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2001: The Historical Context in England’ (1999) 6(2) Charity Law and 
Practice Review 115. 
199  O’Halloran, above n 156, 62–63. 
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That religion operates as a force obliging people to be good and thus 
underpins society is anchored in a widely accepted proposition that even though 
there is a great diversity of belief amongst religions, in the out-workings of 
behaviour all of the major religions teach the equivalent of what is known in 
most common law countries as the golden rule. The golden rule which is often 
articulated as ‘do to others as you would have them do to you’200 exhorts 
adherents to behave altruistically. In this way, religion can be said to provide a 
glue that binds society together voluntarily into a community of citizens – a polis 
in the classical Greek sense or civitas in the Latin expression. This understanding 
of the basis for favour is founded upon, but goes beyond, the favour granted at 
common law to charitable trusts for the advancement of religion. Etymologically, 
religion is that which binds together. It has its root in the Latin ligare from which 
the English word ligament is derived.201  
If this broad meaning is taken as the justification for favours extended to 
religion, then the following purposes, which are not themselves religious but are 
now listed as charitable purposes by sections 3(1)(e) or (h) of the Charities Act 
2011 (UK), could be said to fall within this broader definition: 
1. the advancement of citizenship or community development; and  
2. the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or 
the promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity. 
These two examples illustrate that common law countries do favour 
organisations, other than religious organisations, that help build and sustain the 
infrastructure of democracy. This broad idea leads directly to the question of how 
political purposes might be theorised.202  
The High Court has recently expanded the common law doctrine of 
charitable purpose to include political lobbying over the way foreign aid is 
applied.203 Political parties, athough not generally recognised as charitable, are 
often favoured with tax exemption and tax deductibility.204 So the fiscal 
implications of including them in the class of organisations enjoying charitable 
purpose might be minimal in some jurisdictions. Given this broader 
classification, we contend that the simpler way to proceed is to abolish the 
distinction between political purposes and advancement of religion.205 
We return now to negative expressions of religion and a justification for 
denial of favour on a basis other than religion. This has become a particularly 
contentious issue in Australia, where a Bill intended to deny favours to 
Scientology organisations because of the lack of public benefit was introduced 
                                                
200  Holy Bible (New International Version), New Testament, Luke VI: 31. 
201  ‘Definition of “Ligament”’, The Oxford English Dictionary (online ed) <http://dictionary.oed.com>. 
202  Matthew Turnour, ‘Some Thoughts on the Broader Theoretical Basis for Including Political Purposes 
within the Scope of Charitable Purposes: The Aid/Watch Case’ (2011) 9 International Journal of Civil 
Society Law 85.  
203  Aid/Watch Case (2010) 241 CLR 539.  
204  Steinberg, above n 118, 117, 123. 
205  Turnour, above n 142, 85ff, for problems with maintaining the distinction.  
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into the Senate in 2010.206 First, following Cocks v Manners, it seems 
fundamental that organisations that are ‘adverse to the very foundation of all 
religion’207 or ‘subversive of all morality or religion’208 are not entitled to favour. 
This is evident in the approach taken by the Charity Commission of England and 
Wales which, in 1999, rejected the application by a Scientology organisation to 
be registered as a charity.209 It is also simply repositioning theoretical 
understanding to say that if an organisation is pursuing purposes that are 
subversive of the things that warrant favour – namely morality or religion, and 
more broadly social order and social cohesion – that favour should be denied. 
However, at common law, with respect to the advancement of religion, public 
benefit is presumed until ‘adverse’ or ‘subversive’ purposes are evident. We 
suggest that the presumption of public benefit would be extended to this broader 
class – noting that, implicit in this suggestion, is a very broad view of facilitating 
freedom. Perhaps counter-intuitively, facilitating freedom in this context includes 
the freedom to advocate for reduced freedoms. There will be limits though, for at 
a certain point the exercise of that freedom may be subversive of the very society 
upon which it depends. Where that boundary lies is a matter for debate and not 
central to our argument. It is our thesis only that it is logical to extend the 
approach taken to the advancement of religion to this broader class of purposes 
that facilitate freedom, including organisations that pursue political purposes.210  
Three categories have now been proposed. We suggest that all of the 
charitable purpose cases can be located in one or more of these categories. The 
categories are not mutually exclusive, and if legisation such as taxing statutes 
were to create different classes of benefit for different classes of charities, this 
may create challenges for those that span more than one class. That would be a 
matter for legislatures to address, but we flag it as an issue capable of easy 
resolution, perhaps by allowing charities to enjoy the maximum favours of any 
class they satisfy. We have also suggested that whilst the categories are 
extensions of the Pemsel purposes, they are actually favoured because they 
advance values accepted internationally, namely liberty, equality and 
fraternity.211 Before closing this section, we explain why we have chosen 
advancement of liberty, equality and fraternity as bases for favour.  
 
                                                
206  Tax Laws Amendment (Public Benefit Test) Bill 2010 (Cth). 
207  Re Watson; Hobbs v Smith [1973] 1 WLR 1472, 1473.  
208  Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14. 
209  Charity Commission for England and Wales, Decision of the Commissioners in Application by the 
Church of Scientology (England and Wales) for Registration as a Charity (17 November 1999). 
210  Aid/Watch Case (2010) 241 CLR 539.  
211  Karel Vasak, ‘Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1977) 30 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization Courier 11.  
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IX   REASONS FOR ADOPTING LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND 
FRATERNITY 
Why did we choose liberty, equality and fraternity? First and most 
importantly, when it came to rearranging the charitable purpose cases on the 
jurisprudential table in the manner suggested by Foucault,212 the evident 
similarity between these values as broader classes and the existing heads in 
Pemsel’s Case, stood out. The large fourth head, other purposes beneficial to the 
community,213 seemed both to subsume all the others and demand further 
segmentation. These factors pointed to the possibility that the four heads from 
Pemsel’s Case ‘are but instances’214 of these broader classes. Second, the values 
have broad international acceptance. The concepts of liberty, equality and 
fraternity are set out in the 20th century’s great Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.215 Some countries, such as South Africa, have them enunciated in their 
Constitutions.216 These three values have been adopted in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union217 and remain in the Constitution of 
France today.218 Most common law countries endorse the Universal Declaration 
and those which are EU members are bound by the Charter; so it is easy in their 
case to embrace these values. Of these fundamental values, Pope John Paul II 
declared: ‘In the final analysis, these are Christian ideas’.219 After almost 300 
years, those values have become a (new legal) framework for discussing the 
foundations of society in its politico-legal expression.220  
Second, returning to case law, if we wish to make a case that the Pemsel 
categories ‘are but instances’221 of public benefiting purposes that people will 
pursue voluntarily and altruistically, it follows that the values of liberty, equality 
and fraternity – which articulate values accepted by both secular and sacred – 
should be made the explicit standard bearers.  
                                                
212  Foucault, above n 165, xvii.  
213  Pemsel’s Case [1891] AC 531, 583 (Lord Macnaghten).  
214  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580, setting out a model for legal theory development.  
215  GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). See also 
Vasak, above n 211. 
216  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa), s 7(1) provides: ‘This Bill of Rights 
is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.’ 
217  The six fundamental rights are: dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice: 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/01 (entered into force 1 
December 2009). 
218  La Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958 [French Constitution of 4 October 1958] art 2.  
219  Pope John Paul II, ‘Homily at Le Bourget’ (1 June 1980) 5, cited in Pontifical Council for Justice and 
Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (April 2004) Vatican, fn 793 
<http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_200
60526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html>. 
220  See Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace (Louise and Aylmer Maude trans, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1992) 682 
[trans of: Война и миръ (first published 1889)].  
221  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580. 
844 UNSW Law Journal Volume 35(3) 
 
Our third reason for adopting these values is their long history in 
philosophy.222 Adopting the phrase ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ and bringing the 
ideas as individual concepts into jurisprudential discourse explicitly enriches the 
debate over favour with the debates over these values that found the common law 
heritage.  
Our fourth reason is that this approach builds a bridge between the common 
law and civil traditions by suggesting how the common law values can be 
expressed in civil law language. This bridging might be particularly important for 
common law countries that are parties to the international instruments giving 
voice to these three values.223 
Our final reason is that these divisions arguably could justify different classes 
of favour. For example, organisations with the purpose of Dealing with 
Disadvantage might be exempt from Unrelated Business Taxes or entitled to 
deductible donations where other classes of charities might not be.224 Public 
benefit, not religion itself, provides a rationale for discriminating between 
religious organisations.  
 
X   CONCLUSION 
In both the northern and southern hemispheres, governments are reviewing 
charity law. The early stages of reform involved simply adding further heads to 
purposes already recognised as charitable. We have explored a more radical way 
of understanding the foundational elements of charity jurisprudence. We suggest 
the direction of recent reforms is the ‘wrong way’ to progress, and further, that 
20th century cases have taken the doctrine of charitable purpose the wrong way. 
Categorisation is a dry gully. We have argued Pemsel’s Case can be read as 
allowing the doctrine of charitable purpose to be divided: on the one hand 
defining a jurisdiction for the purpose of regulation; on the other hand for the 
purpose of granting favour. It is also possible to read Pemsel’s Case as not 
compelling an interpretation of the Preamble through the categorisation which 
became the orthodox approach in the 20th century. That orthodox approach 
ossified common law development of the doctrine of charitable purpose because 
                                                
222  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, first published 1692, 1960 ed); 
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Encyclopaedia Britannica, first published 1689, 1952 ed); 
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it failed to follow three fundamental principles of common law methodology. In 
all likelihood, the courts may not feel compelled to depart from the status quo, 
but the common law could continue to develop the doctrine of charitable purpose 
by returning to the fundamentals and rediscovering the jurisprudence 
underpinning Pemsel’s Case. With the courts’ reluctance to engineer a radical 
shift, it may fall to the legislature to initiate a new jurisprudence. We have 
proposed a way of journeying from the Preamble to the concepts of altruism and 
voluntarism. We suggested that public benefit can be theorised as on a continuum 
or divided into three: 
a. private goods supplied to a person for the purposes of Dealing with 
Disadvantage, thereby advancing equality; 
b. quasi-public or public goods supplied to people for the purposes of 
Encouraging Edification, thereby advancing fraternity; and 
c. ligaments binding the polis together, which Facilitates Freedom and thus 
advances liberty. 
Finally, we suggested that these three public benefit categories: advancement 
of equality, fraternity and liberty, can be used as bases for determining and 
denying entitlement to favour. In giving voice to the inherent, but suppressed, 
jurisprudence of the doctrine of charitable purpose, this alternative jurisprudence 
provides fresh direction for charity law reform on both sides of the equator.  
 
 
